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I estimate the relationship between taxes and economic growth using data from 1970-
1999 and the forty-eight continental U.S. states.  I find that taxes used to fund general 
expenditures are associated with significant, negative effects on economic growth.   
Further, this finding is robust across (i) alternative variable specifications, (ii) alternative 
estimation procedures, (iii) alternative ways of dividing the data into “five-year” periods, 
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  1“Bartik (1994a,b) has suggested that the interregional 
elasticity of economic activity with respect to taxes is 
between -0.1 and -0.6 ….[However] the results are not very 
reliable and change depending on which variables are 
included in the estimation equation, or which time period is 
analyzed.” 
     --  Michael  Wasylenko  (1997,  p.  38) 
“My conclusion…is that we are uncertain about the effects 
of economic development policies, including broad state 
fiscal policy, on economic growth.  How does this 
conclusion translate into policy?  My message to policy 
makers is that the effects of state and local tax policy are so 
uncertain that concern over this issue should not be a 
driving force in general policy decisions.” 
 
     --  Therese  McGuire  (1992,  p.  458) 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
A long-standing research enterprise has been devoted to estimating the effect of taxes on 
economic growth in U.S. states.  To the extent a consensus exists, it is that taxes used to 
fund transfer payments have small, negative effects on economic activity.  When used to 
fund productive expenditures, the associated tax effects are often estimated to vanish, or 
even become positive (Helms, 1985; Bartik, 1991; Phillips and Goss, 1995; Wasylenko, 
1997).  However, even this modest conclusion is disputed, since estimated effects vary 
widely across studies (Bartik, 1991; McGuire, 1992; Wasylenko, 1997). 
Given the scores of studies that have investigated this issue, it is surprising that 
many important estimation issues have not been addressed.  My study takes up several of 
these, and re-estimates the relationship between taxes and economic growth.   I find that 
taxes used to fund general expenditures are associated with significant, negative effects 
on economic growth.  Further, I show that these effects are robust across estimation 
procedures, alternative specifications of the regression equation, different time divisions 
  2of the data, and across time periods and states.  I also provide an explanation for why 
previous research has had difficulty identifying these effects. 
  My analysis addresses the following estimation issues.  First, it uses economic 
theory to derive an estimable equation.  With respect to specification of the regression 
equation, theory has consequences for the following:  (i) the inclusion/exclusion of labor, 
capital, and population variables along with or instead of underlying parameters such as 
saving, depreciation, and population growth rates; (ii) the inclusion/exclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable; and (iii) whether to include other explanatory variables in level or 
differenced forms.  Much previous literature has been ad hoc in the selection of variables 
and the form in which they are employed.  
A second specification issue concerns the role of time.  Much of the previous 
literature has restricted taxes to have only contemporaneous effects on economic activity.  
My regression specifications allow for both contemporaneous and lagged effects.  A 
related issue concerns how to define the length of a time period for time series 
observations of states.  Previous research has relied almost exclusively on annual data.  
My study uses five-year periods consistent with most modern empirical growth studies.  I 
show that this has important consequences. 
A third issue is the selection of “control variables.”  Growth theory is sufficiently 
general that a large number of variables can be -- and have been -- argued to be potential 
determinants.  Previous research has been non-systematic in deciding which of these to 
study.  However, it is well known that coefficient estimates are often highly dependent 
upon the particular set of variables included in the regression equation (Leamer, 1985; 
Levine and Renelt, 1992; Crain and Lee, 1999; Sali-i-Martin, 2004).  My study uses 
  3model selection criteria to determine variable specification.  Further, I investigate the 
robustness of my results to alternative variable specifications.   
A fourth issue concerns the choice of estimation procedure.  Panel data with fixed 
effects have been frequently employed in previous studies.  Most previous research uses 
OLS, occasionally employing robust standard error estimators to address 
heteroscedasticity.  In a few cases, dynamic panel data (DPD) estimators have been 
utilized to address bias that arises from including both a lagged dependent variable and 
fixed effects.  My analysis tests for serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and cross-
sectional correlation in the error variance-covariance matrix and investigates the 
robustness of estimating tax effects using alternative, and appropriate, OLS, FGLS, and 
DPD estimators.  
A fifth issue addresses the role of influential observations.  Point estimates may 
mask the fact that results can be driven by just a few time periods, or just a few states.  
This is of particular importance to policy-makers who are interested in extrapolating the 
results of empirical studies to their own states and time periods.  Previous research 
reports only average effects.  In contrast, my analysis interacts tax variables with both 
time and state dummy variables and tests for robustness across these dimensions.   
  The paper proceeds as follows:  Section II derives a model of economic growth 
that is general enough to encompass many of the models that have been used in previous 
research.  Section III describes the data and discusses associated specification issues.  
Section IV presents the initial empirical results.  Section V checks for robustness across 
(i) alternative specifications, (ii) alternative estimation procedures, (iii) different time 
divisions of the data; and (iv) across time periods and states.  Section VI provides an 
  4explanation for why my study finds a robust relationship between taxes and economic 
growth while previous studies have not.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II.    A MODEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
I assume that state income (  ) is determined by the following augmented, neoclassical 
production function,  
t Y
(1)  , 
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where   and   are capital and employment,   is the efficiency of labor, and   
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This can be expressed in log form as 
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  5where  [] [ ] ) (Q   ln ) (Q   ln ) (A   ln ) (A   ln C L - t t L - t t t − + − = β  and L  = the length of the time 
period minus 1 (i.e., for a five-year period with t measuring calendar years, L  = 4).
1, , 2 3   
  Equation (5) identifies changes in capital, employment, and population as 
important determinants of economic growth.  However, the last term,  , allows a role 
for other variables -- potentially many other variables -- to affect economic growth.  It 
encompasses a number of models that appear in the literature (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, 1993; 
Garofalo and Yamarik, 2002; and Lee and Gordon; 2005).  
t C
 
III.    DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES 
 
My data consist of observations on 48 U.S. states from 1970-1999.
4  I decided on this 
particular time period because a longer time frame would have required me to omit many 
variables of interest.  The respective thirty years of data are grouped into 6, five-year 
periods (1970-1974, 1975-1979, … , 1995-1999).  Data for most of these variables were 
collected from original data sources.
5   
  Using five-year rather than annual data offers several advantages:  It (i) averages 
out “business cycle effects” (Grier and Tullock, 1989); (ii) minimizes errors from 
misspecifying lag effects; and (iii) reduces time-specification issues.  Time-specification 
issues arise because data can have different start and end periods within a given calendar 
year.  For example, state income data are defined over calendar years; state fiscal data are 
                                                 
1 In the subsequent empirical work, the difference in log values is multiplied by 100. 
2 An alternative specification solves for the steady state value of y as a function of state parameters, and 
then introduces convergence through the inclusion of a lagged value of the dependent variable.  This both 
(i) imposes additional restrictions on the model and (ii) raises econometric issues of inconsistency from 
using both fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable as explanatory variables.  Nevertheless, the 
approach of this paper is readily applied to selecting control variables for this, and other, specifications. 
3 I also check for robustness when L = 5, so that the endpoints and startpoints of the respective five-year 
periods coincide. 
4 Alaska and Hawaii were omitted, as usual in studies of U.S. state economic growth. 
5 The Appendix presents statistical descriptions of all the variables used in this study. 
  6defined over fiscal years (which are different for different states); and other variables 
(e.g. employment, population data) may be measured at different points within the year 
(beginning/middle/end).  In addition, a number of variables (e.g., variables based on 
decennial Census data) require interpolation in order to get a balanced panel.  For all of 
these reasons, the use of five-year data should entail fewer estimation problems.
  Following Equation (5), the general specification for the empirical models is
6: 
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() t
l
4 t , l l
d
4 t , d t , d d
t 3 t 2 t 1 0
t
X   X X                  
 




β β β β










∑ ∑ − −
where  ; DLNY 1999 1994 1989 1984 1979 1974 t , , , , , = t, DLNKt, DLNLt, and DLNNt are the 
respective difference quantities from Equation (5) multiplied by 100 (to give percent); 
( ) 4 t , d dt X X − −  is the change in the explanatory variable over the five-year period 
(“differenced” form); and   is the value of the explanatory variable at the beginning 
of the five-year period (“level” form).  Note that the last two terms can also be thought of 
as capturing the “contemporaneous” and “lagged” effects of X.   
4 t , l X −
  As my measure of taxes, I use tax burden, defined as the ratio of state and local 
tax revenues to personal income.  Tax burden is by far the most commonly employed 
measure of state taxation, and can be thought of as the “effective average tax rate” in a 
state (e.g., Helms, 1985; Mofidi and Stone, 1994; Mullen and Williams, 1994; Carroll 
                                                 
6 In the estimated specification of Equation (6), I do not impose the restriction that  () 1 2 1 3 − + = β β β  for 
two reasons.  First, population growth could also be a factor included in Ct which, if true, would invalidate 
the restriction.  Second, as a practical matter, this restriction is consistently rejected below the 1-percent 
significance level in all of the top model specifications. 
  7and Wasylenko, 1994; Knight, 2000; Caplan, 2001; Yamarik, 2000, 2004; Tomljanovich, 
2004; Alm and Rogers, 2005).
7
 
IV.    INITIAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
TABLE 1 summarizes the initial results.  The first column (Equation [7]), reports the 
results of estimating a narrowly specified version of Equation (6).  The only explanatory 
variable from the set of differenced variables,  ( ) { }
d 4 t , d t , d X X − − , is the change in tax 
burden, TaxBurden(D); and the only explanatory variable from the set of level variables, 
{ }
l 4 t , l X − , is the value of tax burden at the beginning of the period, TaxBurden(L). 
Both tax variables are negative and highly significant (the t-values are -4.38 and   
-2.25, respectively).  This suggests that taxes have both an immediate and a persistent 
effect.  The coefficient estimate for TaxBurden(D) indicates that a one percentage-point 
increase in tax burden over a five-year period is associated with lower real PCPI growth 
of 1.37 percent during that period.  In addition, an increase in taxes raises the level of tax 
burden, which is associated with lower growth in future time periods.  A state having a 
tax burden that is one percentage point higher than other states is estimated to have real 
PCPI growth that is lower by 0.90 percent in subsequent five-year periods.   
Two points are worth noting.  First, these effects represent the net effect of taxes 
and spending.  Since expenditures variables are omitted from the specification, and since 
the relationship between U.S. state expenditures and revenues is generally one-to-one, the 
respective coefficients should be interpreted as an increase in taxes to fund general 
(unspecified) expenditures.  Second, these estimated effects are sizeable.  The mean value 
of the tax burden variable is 10.87, and the mean growth rate of real PCPI (DLNY) is 8.23 
                                                 
7 Tomljanovich (2004) uses the ratio of total state tax revenues divided by GSP.
  8percent.  Thus, tax variable coefficients in the range of -1.0 represent economically 
important relationships.   
With respect to the rest of the equation, the results indicate that increases in a 
state’s capital stock (DLNK), employed labor force (DLNL), and population (DLNN) are 
each associated with greater income growth.  Overall, the equation has good explanatory 
power, though much of that comes from the state and time fixed effects.
8
  The estimated tax effects of Equation (7) hold constant any effects that taxes 
might have on investment, employment and population growth.  One might reasonably 
expect taxes to be related to these as well.  Equations (8) through (10) investigate this by 
respectively regressing each of these on the two tax variables plus state and time fixed 
effects.  Across all three equations, we see that higher taxes are associated with lower 
investment, lower employment growth, and lower population growth.   
Notably, there are differences in the timing of the respective estimated effects.  
Equations (8) and (9) report that an increase in tax burden is associated with a statistically 
significant decrease in investment and employment growth during the same five-year 
period.  Beyond that period, the tax effects are smaller and statistically insignificant.  In 
contrast, Equation (10) indicates that an increase in tax burden is estimated to have a 
negligible contemporaneous effect on population growth.  However, there is some 
evidence to indicate that higher taxes lower population growth in later time periods (the 
respective p-value is 0.19).  These results are consistent with expectations about how 
taxes might affect each of these variables:  investment and employment are more easily 
adjusted in the short-run, while migration decisions respond more slowly and require 
more time to be realized. 
                                                 
8 The R
2 value for the same specification without state and time fixed effects is 0.744. 
  9The preceding results suggest that taxes influence state economic growth via two 
general channels.  The first channel is associated with the term,  , which collects 
changes in the efficiency of labor ( ) plus the effects of other time-varying factors 
related to productivity ( ).  The second channel is via the terms DLNK, DLNL, and 
DLNN, which incorporate the effects of taxes on investment, employment and population 
growth.  Ideally, one could measure the combined effect of tax burden on economic 
growth by estimating a structural system of equations with DLNY, DLNK, DLNL, and 
DLNN all treated as endogenous.  Unfortunately, a lack of good instruments makes this 




An alternative is to estimate a reduced form version of Equation (7), omitting the 
terms DLNK, DLNL, and DLNN.  Equation (11) reports the results of this exercise.  As 
expected, the combined effect of taxes is estimated to be substantially larger.  A one 
percentage point increase in tax burden is associated with a contemporaneous, decrease 
of 2.59 percent in real PCPI growth.  In addition, future five-year growth rates are 
estimated to be lower by 1.56 percent.  
 
V. ROBUSTNESS  CHECKS 
Robustness with respect to alternative specifications.  One concern with the previous set 
of results is that the estimated tax effects may suffer from omitted variable bias.  It is thus 
important to control for the influence of other variables that may affect state economic 
growth.  The subsequent analysis takes Equation (7) as its starting point, and appends this 
with theoretically appropriate control variables.  
  10It is clear from Equation (5) that a large number of variables could be included as 
proxies for the unobserved term,  .  Reed (2006) identifies thirty-two variables that 
have been used or suggested by previous studies.  Eliminating the public sector variables 
(such as categories of public spending or taxes) -- since including these would change the 
nature of the tax variables -- leaves thirteen non-tax variables.  These are identified in 
TABLE 2.  Each of these can be argued to be included in differenced or level (initial 
value) form.  If one also allows the initial value of income to be included as a regressor
t C
9, 
and recalls that the differenced form of the population variable (DLNN) is already 
included in the core specification, one obtains a total of twenty-six possible control 
variables.
10  
While it is likely that many of these variables do not really belong in the 
regression equation, it is not apparent a priori which ones should be excluded.  Choosing 
one or a few sets of control variables is potentially a problem, since previous literature 
(e.g., Leamer, 1985; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Crain and Lee, 1999; Sali-i-Martin et al., 
2004) has demonstrated that estimated coefficients are often fragile, sensitive to the 
particular composition of conditioning variables.  
  The problem is complicated by the fact that there are  ≅
26 2  67 million ways to 
combine twenty-six variables, each one a possible regression specification.  I address the 
issue of variable specification in the following way.  First, I estimate a complete 
                                                 
)
9 Note that the interpretation of this variable should not be associated with convergence, since the model is 
not specified in steady-state form.  Rather, this variable should be interpreted as proxying for the effect of 
omitted, initial-value variables. 
10 The variable DLNN potentially affects economic growth through two channels:  (i) directly (cf. Equation 
[5]), and (ii) indirectly, through  .  If DLNN did not exert a separate effect via  , then its associated 
coefficient would be 
t C t C
( 1 2 1 − + β β  (cf. Equations [5] and [6]).  However, this hypothesis is consistently 
rejected in the subsequent empirical analyses.  The upshot is that one cannot estimate an analogue of 
Equation (10), appended with control variables, since DLNN would appear as one of the control variables.  
  11specification that includes all twenty-six variables.  Next, I identify and estimate the 
“best” specifications as determined by both SIC and AIC (corrected version) model 
selection criteria.
11  This produces three sets of regression results, each of which is 
reported in TABLE 3 (cf. Equation [12], [13] and [14]).  
Of greatest interest are the first two rows of TABLE 3, which report the estimated 
coefficients of TaxBurden(D) and TaxBurden(L) after including alternative sets of control 
variables.  Both tax coefficients are smaller in absolute value compared to Equation (7), 
where the estimated values are -1.37 and -0.90, respectively.  Nevertheless, they remain 
negative across the expanded specifications of Equations (12) through (14).  Further, they 
continue to be highly significant.  In the “All Variables” specification of Equation (12), 
TaxBurden(D) and TaxBurden(L) have t-statistics(p-values) of, respectively, -2.58(0.011) 
and -2.87(0.004).  The corresponding t-statistics are even higher in Equations (13) and 
(14).  And while these latter two specifications are the product of sequential search, the t-
statistics/p-values for the two tax variables can still be interpreted in the classical manner 
because the search procedure includes these two variables in every specification.   
Turning to the other variables, we find that the estimated coefficients are 
generally consistent with the predictions of growth theory.  Focusing on the coefficients 
from Equation (12) that are significant at the 5-percent level, we observe the following 
results (ignoring the distinction between initial levels and contemporaneous changes):  
higher educational attainment, a greater percentage of the population who are of working 
age, a greater percentage of the population that is nonwhite, a larger population, and a 
greater reliance on agriculture are all associated with higher economic growth.  A larger 
                                                 
11 This procedure, as well as the specific SAS program I use to implement it, is described in further detail in 
Reed (2006). 
  12female population and a larger mining sector are both associated with lower economic 
growth.  Lastly, ceteris paribus, states with a greater initial value of real PCPI grow 
slower than other states.   
In conclusion, I find that the significant, negative tax effects reported in Equation 
(7) are robust to the inclusion of a wide variety of control variables.  The next section 
investigates the robustness of the relationship between tax burden and state economic 
growth when alternative estimation procedures are employed. 
Robustness with respect to alternative estimation procedures.  The subsequent 
analysis selects Equation (13) as the best of the preceding specifications.  This OLS 
equation displays good properties.  It has a high R
2, the key explanatory variables all have 
large t-statistics, the Durbin-Watson statistic is close to 2, and a test of error normality 
fails to be rejected at the 5 percent level.
12  Potential (individual) heteroscedasticity is 
addressed by using robust (White) standard errors. 
However, there are at least two concerns.  First, panel data are often characterized 
by complex error structures.  Using the residuals from Equation (13), I tested for (i) first-
order serial correlation and (ii) cross-sectional correlation (which includes groupwise 
heteroscedasticity as a special case).  I found no evidence of significant serial correlation 
(the estimated value of the AR(1) parameter was -0.02).  However, I calculated an 
average, absolute value of cross-sectional correlation equal to 0.36 and strongly rejected 
the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional correlation.  This raises worries about the 
inefficiency of coefficient estimates and biasedness in the estimates of standard errors.
13
                                                 
12 The Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.15; and the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.07, with an associated p-value of 
0.079. 
13 Note that “White standard errors” are robust only to individual heteroscedasticity, and not cross-sectional 
correlation. 
  13Unfortunately, while one can estimate an error variance-covariance matrix that 
allows for cross-sectional correlation, one cannot invert that matrix, since N=48 > T=6.  
This precludes the use of Parks-type FGLS.  However, there are several alternatives.  One 
alternative is to continue to use OLS, but adjust the standard errors for cross-sectional 
correlation; either by using Beck and Katz’s “panel-corrected standard error” procedure 
(Beck and Katz, 1995), or by using a more robust estimator of the error variance-
covariance matrix.  Another is to follow-up a suggestion by Greene (2003, pages 333f.) 
and use FGLS, weighting on groupwise heteroscedasticity while adjusting the standard 
errors for cross-sectional correlation.  Accordingly, I check for robustness of the 
estimated tax effects across the following four alternative estimation procedures: 
1.  OLS with panel-corrected standard errors 
 
2.  OLS with robust estimation of the error variance-covariance matrix assuming 
cross-sectional correlation (i.e. “cluster” standard errors) 
 
3.  FGLS (weighted on groupwise heteroscedasticity) with panel-corrected standard 
errors 
 
4.  FGLS (weighted on groupwise heteroscedasticity) with “cluster” standard errors  
 
There is also a second concern.  Equation (13) includes both fixed effects and a 
lagged form of the dependent variable as explanatory variables.  This generates 
correlation between the error term and the lagged form of the dependent variable, causing 
biased coefficient estimates (Nickell, 1981).  To address this concern, I use a dynamic 
panel data (DPD) estimator -- specifically, the Arellano-Bond, two-step procedure.   
TABLE 4 reports the estimates from these alternative estimation procedures.  For 
comparison’s sake, the first row duplicates the tax burden estimates from Equation (13) 
in TABLE 3.  There are two main findings from this analysis:  Both FGLS and DPD 
  14confirm earlier results in that they produce negative coefficient estimates for each of the 
tax variables.  The FGLS estimates are similar in size to the OLS estimates, while the 
DPD estimates are larger (in absolute value).  In addition, the statistical significance of 
the tax effects is confirmed across all alternative estimation procedures.  Of the twelve t-
statistics reported in TABLE 4, all are larger than 2 and only one is less than 3 in absolute 
value.  Accordingly, I conclude that my main findings of negative, statistically significant 
tax effects are robust across alternative estimation procedures. 
Robustness across alternative cuts of the data.  The preceding analyses divide the 
thirty years of data from 1970-1999 into six periods of five-years each: 1970-1974, 1975-
1979, … , 1995-1999.  This section looks at two alternative ways of dividing the data.  
The first approach allows the endpoint of one five-year period to coincide with the 
beginning of the next five-year period.  Following this approach, the data are divided as 
follows: 1970-1975, 1975-1980, 1980-1985, … , 1995-2000.  A drawback of this 
approach is that it forces dependency between contiguous time periods.  An alternative 
approach keeps the endpoints and beginning points of the periods separate, but shifts the 
data by a year:  1971-1975, 1976-1980, … , 1996-2000.   
TABLE 5 reports the results.  The first column of TABLE 5 uses FGLS 
(weighting on groupwise heteroscedasticity) with “cluster” standard errors to estimate the 
variable specification of Equation (13).
14  These results were previously reported in 
abbreviated form in TABLE 4 (cf. the next to last row).  The subsequent two columns use 
the same estimation procedure and variable specification but employ different cuts of the 
data. 
                                                 
14 I chose this estimation procedure given that testing of the residuals produced evidence of 
heteroscedasticity/cross-sectional correlation. 
  15Alternative cuts of the data can make a difference.  For example, the estimates for 
Female(D) change considerably, with the respective t-values ranging from -4.38 to -1.51.  
The coefficients for Mining(D) and Diversity(L) also show substantial variation, even 
switching signs.  Indeed, the coefficient for TaxBurden(L) in Column (3) is less than half 
the size of the equivalent estimate in Column (1), with a correspondingly large change in 
the respective t-statistic. 
Nevertheless, these estimates provide overall confirmation of the previous tax   
burden results.  Across the alternative time divisions of the data, the coefficients of the 
two tax variables are negatively signed and statistically significant, always having a t-
statistic larger than two in absolute value. 
  Robustness across time periods and states.  A possible concern with previous 
estimates is that the results may be driven by a few time periods/states with particularly 
strong relationships between tax burden and economic growth, and may not be broadly 
representative for the majority of observations.  Previous specifications assumed that the 
estimated tax effects were the same for all time periods and states.  In this section, I use 
interaction terms to estimate individual time period and state effects.   
  I first check for robustness across time periods.  There are a total of 6 five-year 
periods: (1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999).  I 
respecify Equation (13) and include time-interaction effects to capture changes in the tax 
burden/economic growth relationship over time.  Following the previous results on 
estimation procedures, all coefficients are estimated using FGLS (with weighting for 
groupwise heteroscedasticity), with a White robust estimator for cross-sectional 
correlation used to calculate standard errors.  I first estimate time-specific coefficients for 
  16the variable TaxBurden(D).  I then repeat the robustness check by estimating time-
specification coefficients for the variable TaxBurden(L).   
TABLE 6 summarizes the results.  Notably, each of the twelve corresponding 
time-specific coefficients is negative.  Ten of the twelve are individually significant, and 
the time-specific interaction terms for both TaxBurden(D) and TaxBurden(L) are jointly 
significant at well below the 5-percent significance level.  
These latter results suggest that the relationship between tax burden and economic 
growth varies over time periods.  While the pattern isn’t perfect, smaller estimated 
coefficients for TaxBurden(D) are generally accompanied by larger coefficients for 
TaxBurden(L), and vice versa.  A similar pattern is observable when I estimate state-
specific interaction terms.  An interpretation consistent with these results is that changes 
in tax burden take longer during some time periods to register their impact on economic 
growth.  Even so, the most important observation from TABLE 6 is that the relationships 
between economic growth and both the differenced and level forms of tax burden are 
estimated to be negative in every time period. 
 TABLE 7 reports the results of a similar analysis using state-specific interaction 
terms. These are presented in summary form, rather than reporting state-specific 
coefficients for each of the 48 states.  The estimates are not as one-sided as in TABLE 6, 
no doubt due in part to the fact that each of the state-specific coefficients relies on only 
six time-periods of data (compared to the time-specific coefficients, which use forty-eight 
state observations).   
Even so, the results are consistent with tax burden being negatively associated 
with economic growth across most states.  Of the forty-eight, state-specific coefficients 
  17for  TaxBurden(D), 72.9 percent are negative.  Of these, fourteen are statistically 
significant, and twelve of these are negative (85.7 percent).  The corresponding numbers 
for the TaxBurden(L) coefficients are 64.5 and 70.0 percent, respectively.  Notably, there 
are no states that have positive, state-specific coefficients for both TaxBurden(D) and 
TaxBurden(L). 
In conclusion, these results suggest that the tax effects estimated in earlier 
specifications are generally robust across time periods and states, and are not driven by a 
few observations exerting a disproportionately strong influence. 
 
VI.  WHY HAVE PREVIOUS STUDIES FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO  
ESTIMATE ROBUST TAX EFFECTS? 
 
In this section I provide an explanation of why I am able to find evidence of a robust 
negative empirical relationship between taxes and economic growth, when so many other 
researchers have not.  Column (1) of TABLE 8 uses OLS to estimate an annual analogue 
to Equation (13).  The data cover 1970-1999 and include the log of capital, employment, 
and population, along with state and annual time fixed effects and a number of other 
control variables.  The dependent variable is the log of real PCPI.  I begin by following 
the conventional practice of only including contemporaneous values of the explanatory 
variables.
15  
  In contrast to the prior results, I now estimate a positive relationship between tax 
burden and state incomes.  A one-percentage point increase in tax burden is estimated to 
increase real state PCPI by 0.16 percent.  Further, the coefficient is significant well below 
the 5 percent level, with a t-value just over three.   
                                                 
15  A notable exception is Tomljanovich (2004).  However, he does not include any state-specific, time-
varying variables other than tax, expenditure, and aid variables. 
  18To check the sensitivity of this result, I drop various sets of variables from the 
specification of Column (1).  Column (2) drops the capital, employment, population, and 
lagged income variables.  Column (3) drops these, plus the control variables.  Column (4) 
drops these, plus all fixed effects.  While the statistical significance of the coefficient 
changes depending upon the specification, the finding of a positive relationship between 
tax burden and state income does not. 
  However, a different picture emerges when the specification is broadened to allow 
lagged effects.  Column (5) reports the results of adding lagged values of the tax burden 
variable to the specification of Column (1).  While the contemporaneous relationship 
between tax burden and economic growth remains positive, lagged values of tax burden 
are estimated to be negatively associated with state income.  
A full reconciliation of my results with previous research lies beyond the scope of 
this study.  However, this analysis suggests that prior studies failed to identify a robust, 
negative relationship between taxes and economic growth because they relied on 
specifications that did not allow for lagged tax effects, and used annual data.  My analysis 
suggests that tax policies take time to work their full effects on the economy.  When the 
specification is sufficiently general to pick up these effects, a negative relationship 
between taxes and economic growth emerges.   
Further, a comparison of TABLE 8 with previous results indicates that the 
organization of the data into five-year periods is also important.  This may be due to the 
fact that income and fiscal policy variables interact over time in complex ways that are 
difficult to model.  A complementary reason is that the data do not line up well at an 
annual level:  Income data are defined over calendar years.  Fiscal data are defined over 
  19fiscal years which typically run from the mid-point of one calendar year to the mid-point 
of the next.  Other variables such as employment and population are measured at 
different points in time.  In addition, variables based on decennial Census data require 
interpolation to produce annual values.  Organizing the data in five-year periods reduces 




Using five-year data from 1970-1999 and the forty-eight continental states, I find strong 
evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between taxes and 
economic growth.  Further, I find that this relationship is robust across (i) alternative 
variable specifications, (ii) alternative estimation procedures, (iii) alternative ways of 
dividing the data into “five-year” periods, and (iv) allowing for individual-specific time 
and state effects.   
  These results are surprising given that previous studies have had difficulty 
identifying a substantial relationship between state taxes and incomes.  My analysis 
suggests that this may be because previous studies have tended to use specifications 
which did not allow for lagged tax variables, and used annual data.  When I use annual 
data and restrict the analysis to contemporaneous tax effects, I find no evidence of a 
negative tax effect.  When I include lagged values of the tax variable, a negative 
relationship between taxes and growth emerges.  The organization of the data into five-
year periods also matters.  This might be because the variables interact over time in 
complex ways that are difficult to model.  It may also be because the data -- for 
definitional and measurement reasons -- are not well-suited to relating to each other at the 
annual level. 
  20  Much work remains to be done before reliable estimates of tax effects can be 
obtained.
16  However, this study establishes that there is an important empirical 
relationship between taxes and U. S. state economic growth.  Obtaining a better 
understanding of the nature and cause of that relationship is a potentially fruitful avenue 
for future research.  It is hoped that this study will stimulate efforts towards that end. 
 
                                                 
16 A key remaining issue is the problem of endogeneity between tax policy and economic conditions.  
Policy makers frequently raise taxes during economic downturns, and lower taxes during times of 
economic prosperity (Poterba, 1994).  This generates a negative bias to estimates of contemporaneous tax 
effects.  While this cannot explain why I find a negative, lagged effect for tax burden (cf. the coefficient for 
TaxBurden[L]), it may contribute to the estimated, negative effect for contemporaneous changes in the tax 
burden variable (cf. the coefficient for TaxBurden[D]).   
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TABLE 1 
Estimation of the Relationship Between Tax Burden and Economic Growth:  
Initial Results 
 
  Equation (7) Equation (8) Equation (9) Equation (10) Equation (11)















DLNK  0.3304 
(7.26)  ---- ----  ----  ---- 
DLNL  0.4258 
(6.70)  ---- ----  ----  ---- 
DLNN  0.4241 
(5.02)  ---- ----  ----  ---- 

































SIC  729.84 ----  ----  ----  1043.76 
AICc  815.28 ----  ----  ----  1156.85 
Observations  288 288 288  288  288 
 
Hypothesis Tests
       
State effects = 0 
χ
















2 = 60.99 
(p-value = 
0.083) 
Time effects = 0 
χ





















NOTE:  Coefficients are estimated using OLS.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are 
calculated using White heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  All equations include state 
and time fixed effects.  AICc denotes the “corrected” version of the AIC.  Summary statistics for 
each of the variables are reported in the Appendix. TABLE 2 
List of Potential Control Variables for the Core Specification of Equation (7)
17
 
VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION (ALL VARIABLES 
CALCULATED AS 5-YEAR AVERAGES) 
SELECTED STUDIES WHICH HAVE USED THIS 
OR A RELATED VARIABLE 
Education  Percent of population (aged 25 and up) who 
have completed college (SOURCE: Census) 
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985); Garcia-Milà and 
McGuire (1992); Crown and Wheat (1995); Phillips and 
Goss (1995); Dalenberg and Partridge (1995); Partridge 
and Rickman (1996); Clark and Murphy (1996); Ciccone 
and Barro (1996); Crain and Lee (1999) 
Working 
Population 
Percent of population between 20 and 64 years 
of age (SOURCE: Census) 
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985); Mofidi and Stone 
(1990); Dalenberg and Partridge (1995); Crain and Lee 
(1999) 
Nonwhite  Percent of population that is nonwhite 
(SOURCE: Census) 
Mofidi and Stone (1990); Partridge and Rickman (1996); 
Crain and Lee (1999) 
Female  Percent of population that is female (SOURCE: 
Census) 
Mofidi and Stone (1990); Partridge and Rickman (1996); 
Clark and Murphy (1996) 
Population  Log of total population (SOURCE: Census)  Ciccone and Hall (1996); Alm and Rogers (2005) 
Population Density 
 
Population density (SOURCE: Census) 
 
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985); Carroll and Wasyenko 
(1994); Clark and Murphy (1996); Ciccone and Hall 
(1996); Crain and Lee (1999) 
 
Urban  Percent of population living in urban areas 
(SOURCE: Census) 
Holtz-Eakin (1993); Partridge and Rickman (1996); Crain 
and Lee (1999) 
                                                 
17 This table is excerpted from Reed (2006). 
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VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION (ALL VARIABLES 
CALCULATED AS 5-YEAR AVERAGES) 
SELECTED STUDIES WHICH HAVE USED THIS 
OR A RELATED VARIABLE 
 
Agriculture 
Share of total earnings earned in “Farm” and 
“Other Agriculture” industries (SOURCE: 
BEA) 
Crown and Wheat (1995); Caselli and Coleman (2001) 
Manufacturing  Share of total earnings earned in 
“Manufacturing” industries (SOURCE: BEA) 
Crown and Wheat (1995); Crain and Lee (1999); Caselli 
and Coleman (2001); Stansel (2005) 
Service  Share of total earnings earned in “Service” 
industries (SOURCE: BEA)  Clark and Murphy (1996) 
Mining  Share of total earnings earned in “Mining” 
industries (SOURCE: BEA) 
Holtz-Eakin (1993); Crown and Wheat (1995); Clark and 
Murphy (1996); Mitchener and McLean (2003) 
Union 
Percent of nonagricultural wage and salary 
employees who are union members (SOURCE: 
Hirsch, McPherson, and Vroman, 2001) 
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Mofidi and Stone (1990); 
Dalenberg and Partridge (1995); Phillips and Goss 
(1995); Partridge and Rickman (1996); Clark and Murphy 
(1996) 
Diversity 




Earnings   Total  
Industry   in   Earnings








Mofidi and Stone (1990); Garcia-Milà and McGuire 
(1992); Partridge and Rickman (1996); Crain and Lee 
(1999) 
 TABLE 3 





























































L  -0.2699 
(-1.77)  ----  -0.3633 
(-2.83) 







L  0.3608 
(0.46)  ---- ---- 
Population L  2.8954 
(1.50) 
4.0213 
(3.19)  ---- 
D  0.0300 
(0.74)  ---- ---- 
Population Density 
L  0.0217 
(1.64)  ----  0.0269 
(2.39) 
D  -0.1486 
(-1.32)  ---- ---- 
Urban 
L  -0.0674 
(-0.94)  ---- ---- 
                                                 
18 Summary statistics for each of the variables is reported in the Appendix. 


























D  -0.0218 
(-0.13)  ---- ---- 
Manufacturing 
L  -0.0304 
(-0.25)  ---- ---- 
D  0.0397 
(0.16)  ---- ---- 
Service 
L  -0.3083 
(-1.90)  ----  -0.2956 
(-2.57) 







L  -0.3006 
(-1.58)  ---- ---- 







L  0.0182 
(0.27)  ---- ---- 
D  0.2591 
(1.00)  ----  0.3241 
(1.57) 
Diversity 
L  -0.2144 
(-1.02) 
-0.3495 
(-2.26)  ---- 






Number of observations  288 288 288 
R
2 0.938 0.933 0.935 
SIC  624.70 572.52 573.91 
AICc  675.36 647.78 645.00 
 
NOTE:  The regression equation follows the general specification of Equation (6) in the text.  
“D” and “L” stand for differenced and level forms of the variables.  In addition to the variables 
listed above, the model includes the variables DLNK, DLNL, DLNN, and state and time fixed 
effects.  t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below each estimated coefficient.  
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TABLE 4 
Robustness Check Using Alternative Estimation Procedures 
Procedure TaxBurden(D)  TaxBurden(L) 
OLS -0.5470 -0.6905 
with robust VCE for individual heteroscedasticity  (-3.59) (-3.20) 
with panel-corrected standard errors  (-2.88) (-3.35) 
with robust VCE for cross-sectional correlation  (-5.43) (-6.57) 
FGLS (weighted on groupwise heteroscedasticity) -0.5086 -0.6494 
with robust VCE for individual heteroscedasticity  (-3.83) (-3.89) 
with panel-corrected standard errors  (-3.52) (-4.43) 
with robust VCE for cross-sectional correlation  (-3.54) (-8.00) 
 
DPD







NOTE:  Coefficient estimates are boldface and italicized; t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Each estimation procedure 
estimates the same variable specification as Equation (13) in TABLE 3.  The first set of OLS results repeats those results for 
comparison’s sake.  The respective estimation procedures are described in greater detail in Section IV.   
 TABLE 5 
Robustness Check Using Alternative Cuts of the Data 
 
Variable 
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Number of observations  288 288 288 
 
NOTE:  Each of the three sets of regression results employs FGLS (weighting on groupwise 
heteroscedasticity) with robust VCE for cross-sectional correlation.  t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the respective coefficient estimates.  The first column reproduces previous 
results for comparison’s sake (cf. the next to last row in TABLE 4).  The next two columns show 
the effects of using different cuts of the data.  




Robustness Check Across Time Periods 
 
TIME-SPECIFIC COEFFICIENTS 
TaxBurden(D) TaxBurden(L) Time Period 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
1970-1974  -1.1551  -9.83  -0.3062  -5.18 
1975-1979  -0.7518  -4.58  -0.6710  -7.32 
1980-1984  -0.0615  -0.24  -0.6455  -7.18 
1985-1989  -0.1642  -0.71  -0.9044  -6.61 
1990-1994  -0.6450  -2.97  -1.0086  -8.20 
1995-1999  -1.1014  -5.17  -0.5286  -4.98 
Test of Significance for 
Time Interaction Terms: 
χ
2 = 14.214 
(p-value = 0.014) 
χ
2 = 13.427 
 (p-value = 0.020) 
 
NOTE:  Estimation results are generated by estimating the core variable specification of 
Equation (13), supplemented with the respective time-interaction dummy variables (cf. the text 
for further details).  The estimation procedure is FGLS (weighting on groupwise 
heteroscedasticity) with robust VCE for cross-sectional correlation.  t-statistics are generated 








  TaxBurden(D) TaxBurden(L) 
Total Number of Coefficients / 
Number Negative 
(Percent Negative) 
48 / 35 
(72.9) 
48 / 31 
(64.5) 
Total Number of  Significant Coefficients / 
Number Negative 
(Percent Negative) 
14 / 12 
(85.7) 
10 / 7 
(70.0) 
Test of Significance for  
State Interaction Terms: 
χ
2 = 106.396 
(p-value = 0.000) 
χ
2 = 94.653 
 (p-value = 0.000) 
 
NOTE:  This table uses the same estimation procedure as TABLE 6, except that state-specific interaction terms are used.  Given their 
large number, individual state results are not reported. 
 
 
 TABLE 8 
Estimation of the Relationship Between  
Tax Burden and Economic Growth Using Annual Data 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










TaxBurden(-1)  ---- ---- ---- ----  -0.0025 
(-1.96) 
TaxBurden(-2)  ---- ---- ---- ----  -0.0020 
(-1.62) 
TaxBurden(-3)  ---- ---- ---- ----  -0.0001 
(-0.11) 
TaxBurden(-4)  ---- ---- ---- ----  -0.0025 
(-2.63) 
LNK  0.0754 
(8.84)  ---- ---- ----  0.0936 
(9.97) 
LNL  0.1073 
(8.19)  ---- ---- ----  0.1330 
(9.79) 
LNN  0.0064 
(5.91)  ---- ---- ----  0.0034 
(3.29) 
LNY_1  0.7466 
(65.25)  ---- ---- ----  0.7180 
(55.54) 
Education  0.0034 
(10.38) 
0.0174 







(25.28)  ---- ----  0.0055 
(11.19) 
Nonwhite  -0.0004 
(-2.84) 
-0.0008 
(-2.38)  ---- ----  -0.0001 
(-1.09) 
Female  0.0112 
(8.33) 
-0.0014 
(-0.37)  ---- ----  0.0127 
(8.95) 
Agriculture  0.0028 
(12.11) 
0.0057 
(11.53)  ---- ----  0.0015 
(5.11) 
Mining  -0.0005 
(-1.16) 
0.0029 
(4.80)  ---- ----  -0.0011 
(-2.74) 
  36 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Union  0.0008 
(5.31) 
0.0049 
(15.24)  ---- ----  0.0013 
(8.45) 
Diversity  0.0032 
(7.06) 
0.0039 

















observations  1440 1440 1440 1440 1248 
R
2 0.994 0.944 0.843 0.448 0.993 
 
NOTE:  The dependent variable is the log of real Per Capita Personal Income (1984 dollars).  
All equations are estimated using OLS.  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
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APPENDIX 
 Statistical Summary of Data 
 
Variable Mean  Std. 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
DLNY
1 8.23 5.20 -9.38  40.45 
DLNK
2 7.42 7.81  -26.92  55.43 
DLNL
3 4.66 3.99 -7.22  14.97 
DLNN
4 4.63 4.48 -8.63  21.45 
D 0.13  0.88  -5.52  5.91 
Tax Burden
5
L  10.87 1.37  7.92 19.27 
D  1.77 0.55 0.34 3.21 
Education
6
L  16.41 4.92  6.66 30.21 
D 0.97  0.93  -1.22  2.93  Working 
Population
6
L  55.84 3.18 47.54  62.26 
D 0.56  0.51  -0.98  2.42 
Nonwhite
6
L  11.75 8.76  0.36 37.35 
D  -0.02 0.15 -0.57 0.75 
Female
6
L  51.23 0.77 48.77  52.76 
Population
6 L  14.93 1.00 12.72  17.27 
D 4.93  6.68  -8.44  37.26  Population 
Density
6
L 162.25  230.78  3.44  1089.83 
D 0.75  1.13  -1.97  3.96 
Urban
6
L  67.18 14.43 32.16 93.54 
D -0.06  2.46  -16.72  18.85 
Agriculture
6
L 3.28  3.98  -8.92  29.06 
D  -0.81 1.68 -6.09 3.37 
Manufacturing
6
L  20.93 8.42  3.73 40.49 
D 1.47  1.25  -3.22  6.40 
Service
6
L  19.51 5.65 10.93  41.55 
D  -0.19 0.76 -3.29 4.27 
Mining
6
L  2.15 3.53 0.02  24.98 
  38Variable Mean  Std. 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
D -1.47  2.36  -10.6  5.0 
Union
6
L  18.48  8.12 3.3 41.7 
D  -0.06 0.77 -5.42 4.66 
Diversity
6
L  17.36 2.05 13.84  23.56 
LNY_1




1 DLNY is the percent change in real Per Capita Personal Income (1984 dollars).   
2 DLNK is the percent change in net private Capital Stock created through 1-digit SIC industries 
(measured in millions of chained 1996 dollars).  These data were provided by Steve Yamarik (cf. 
Garofalo and Yamarik[2002]). 
3 DLNL is the percent change in total employment (source: BEA). 
4 DLNN is the percent change in total population (source: Census). 
5 Tax Burden is the ratio of total state and local tax revenues over total state personal income. 
6 These variables are described in TABLE 2. “D” denotes the five-year difference in the variable 
over the period (t-4,t). “L” denotes the value of the variable at the beginning of the five-year 
period. 
7 LNY_1 is the value of the log of real Per Capita Personal Income (1984 dollars) at the 
beginning of the five-year period. 
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